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ABSTRACT 
This thesis proposes to correct the shortfalls in the U.S. Surface Combatants 
ability to counter a Sea-Control Navy. The concept counters this threat using unmanned 
aerial systems, decoys, and a layered defense. We analyze the performance with a 
Filtering Model of Salvo Warfare that is an extension of the Hughes Salvo Equations. 
The model incorporates the diluting effect of decoys upon enemy salvos and accounts for 
the historical reality of leakers. We conclude that in the absence of air support provided 
by U.S. Carriers the warships that will have to reestablish sea control will be Arleigh 
Burke Destroyers based on current force composition. In summary, the thesis illustrates 
serious combat shortfalls in Surface Warfare of DDGs against a numerically superior 
Chinese Surface Action Group and proposes a reasonable solution of three key upgrades. 
The first upgrade is a long range TASM-like missile to correct the current DDG’s lack of 
long range offensive missiles. The next two upgrades are both unmanned aerial systems. 
The Global Hawk maritime variant would provide offensive targeting data to surface 
combatants allowing for a successful first strike. The Fire Scout would provide local 
airborne early warning to allow for timely launches of decoys and defensive missiles. 
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THESIS DISCLAIMER 
The reader is cautioned that computer programs developed in this research may 
not have been exercised for all cases of interest. While every effort has been made within 
the available time to ensure that the programs are free of computational and logic errors, 
they cannot be considered validated. Any application of these programs without 
additional verification and validation is at the risk of the user. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This thesis addresses surface warfare shortfalls of U.S. Navy Destroyers when 
countering a Chinese Sea-Control Navy in the absence of carrier based strike aircraft. The 
analysis was conducted using a new Filtering Model, an extension of the Hughes Salvo 
Equations that incorporates decoys and leakers. Using the Filtering Model, we analyzed 
five scenarios. In the first scenario current force composition is compared in the form of a 
three DDG Surface Action Group confronting a six ship PLA Navy Surface Action 
Group. In the second, we add “leakers” (ASCMs that penetrate SAM defense). In the 
third scenario a proposed Tomahawk Anti-Ship Missile (TASM) with the added 
capability of persistent long range ISR is shown. In the fourth scenario, we add enhanced 
defensive capability with local airborne early warning (AEW) and the use of decoys. In 
the fifth scenario the DDGs with all three combined upgrades are compared against the 
Chinese SAG.  
The results show that four DDGs can reach parity with a Chinese SAG of three 
Luyang II and three Sovremenny Destroyers with three key upgrades. The first upgrade is 
a long range TASM-like missile to correct the current DDG’s lack of long range 
offensive missiles. The next two upgrades are both unmanned aerial systems. The Global 
Hawk maritime variant would provide offensive targeting data to surface combatants 
allowing for a successful first strike. The Fire Scout would provide local airborne early 
warning to allow for timely launches of decoys and defensive missiles.  
With these additions and based on the results we propose a concept of operations 
to allow a U.S. SAG to compete with a Chinese SAG for sea control. Results show that a 
2:3 ratio is required to reach parity using upgraded DDGs. Four DDGs each operating 
three Fire Scouts would allow decoy systems to decoy and eliminate a significant number 
of attacking missiles. This would greatly reduce the number left to engage using point 
defense. Two Global Hawks operating around 80 to 100 nautical miles away would 
provide enough ISR to allow for the U.S. SAG to conduct a first attack. The TASM 
 xvi
would then be employed to eliminate enemy surface combatants. The results stress the 
importance of offensive missile range and defensively launching decoys. 
 xvii
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
The U.S. Navy has since World War II relied upon the presumption of carrier 
dominance to provide persistent Air Support for surface combatants. This has allowed the 
American surface combatants to become better suited as land attack platforms than for 
surface warfare. “The Navy because of its Sea Sanctuary has not been shot at much and 
has had less motivation to change.” (Hughes 2006) The sea sanctuary has been 
guaranteed to U.S. warships by U.S. carriers because of their immense capabilities and 
more importantly after the Cold War there has not been a peer competitor to challenge 
them for sea control.  
There has been a great deal of attention paid to surface warfare in littoral waters 
with the primary threat coming from numerous missile-laden vessels that move at great 
speed. This has resulted in heated debates over platform types and the numbers required 
for these specialized missions against a potent but smaller nation adversary. Of course, to 
get to the littorals access must be first established by controlling the blue water. This is a 
mission that U.S .Carriers have accomplished successfully.  
Efforts to circumvent the Carrier’s dominance have developed in the form of an 
“Assassin’s Mace” weapon designed to foul the flight deck which would provide a 
mission kill essentially placing that platform out of action. China has demonstrated that 
they have the capability to shadow U.S. carriers with submarines capable of launching 
such a weapon at close range. Therefore, the Carrier is placed out of action from a 
mission kill or it is cautiously pulled far enough away to minimize this threat creating an 
end result that is essentially the same; ceded battle-space. Modern sea-denial or anti-
access efforts carried out in the open ocean by any nation refreshes the necessity of sea 
control by one navy over another that seeks to restrict access to trade routes or resources. 
This thesis explores a scenario where disputes over natural resources with China could 
draw the U.S. Navy into a mission area that it is unaccustomed to and unprepared for. 
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 The problem is that sea control must be regained against a peer competitor such as 
China that has roughly equivalent surface combatants with longer range offensive 
missiles. The U.S. Navy has not pursued offensive missile technology for its surface 
combatants to the extent that other countries have because of the U.S. reliance upon 
carrier air dominance. When a U.S. surface action group’s surface warfare capabilities 
are assessed against China’s without carrier air coverage the disparities are glaring.  
 Currently there are numerous anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) designed 
specifically to defeat the Aegis weapon system both in quantity and capability. The U.S. 
Navy fleet size is dwindling as an unfortunate antithesis to the importance of numerical 
superiority in surface warfare. The prevalence of so many cost effective ASCMs makes 
our numerical disadvantage against enemy fleets even more critical. 
B. SCENARIO 
Southwest of the Spratley Islands there are many oil and natural gas resources 
found in the seabed that have been claimed by a panoply of countries including Malaysia, 
Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, and China. The increasing importance of global energy 
resources increases tensions among countries vying for ownership. This scenario could 
quite easily take place off the coast of Japan or many other countries but the underlying 
point is that scarce resources offshore will require a naval force to demonstrate control. 
This region is routinely hit by major typhoons, heavy monsoons, and devastating 
tsunamis caused by earthquakes. These volatile seas also host a considerable threat of 
piracy lured by the steady stream of merchant vessels that congest and complicate the 
battle space.  
In the scenario a severe natural disaster brings the Chinese to the aid of Pacific 
rim neighbors. China then uses that momentary advantage to seize control of the seas 
southwest of the Spratley Islands. The U.S. is forced to intercede on behalf of the 
Philippines, Vietnam, and Indonesia to contest China’s assertion of ownership. China 
threatens retaliation and openly directs available submarines to shadow and harass the 
two U.S. carriers in the area. The result is that the U.S. must send in a surface action 
group to counter the Chinese force leading to various missile exchange combinations.  
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C.  PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate current shortfalls in surface warfare of 
a surface action group against a comparable Chinese force. We are using a Filtering 
Model of Salvo Warfare based upon Hughes Salvo Equations to demonstrate the benefits 
of decoys and take into account the historical reality of leakers. We will use these results 
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II. SALVO MODEL 
A. HUGHES SALVO MODEL 
1. Background 
Hughes salvo model (Hughes 2000) is a useful analytic tool for assessing the 
crucial capabilities of surface combatants. The model provides a method to analyze the 
important trade-offs between defensive power, offensive power, staying power, and 
numbers of units. Analysis of these principle factors has allowed these equations to be 
used in comparing two opposing forces at sea to explore how they match up. The 
equations can be used to show the Fractional Exchange Rate (FER) of one force to 
another based upon the number of incoming missiles that continue on to point defense 
after having been engaged by defensive missiles of the opposing force. The simplicity of 
the equations contradicts the complexity of the interactions between the principle factors.  
2. Assumptions 
The salvo model assumes that a salvo is uniformly distributed across all defending 
units. As a mathematical artifact the model assumes a linear transition within offensive 
power, defensive power, and staying power. Another assumption is that once parity is 
reached any additional shots are unable to be engaged and will saturate the defender. In 
the equations fractions will result but that does not imply a fractional hit or softkill. Each 
force is also assumed to be homogenous. 
3. Definitions  
 a.  Force 
A group of naval warships that fight against an enemy group. 
 
 b.  Unit 
An individual warship in a force. 
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 c.  Salvo 
A number of shots fired from a force in a discrete time period.  
 d.  Engagement 
A number of shots fired in the same salvo. 
 e.  Offensive Power 
The maximum number of shots that can be fired by one unit in one Salvo 
at the opposing force. 
 f.  Defensive Power 
The maximum number of attacking shots that can be killed by a unit. 
 g. Staying Power  
The number of shots a unit can take before being placed out of action. 
 h.  Scouting Effectiveness 
A number between zero and one that describes the potential for one force 
to target another. At one, the attacker can fire with perfect targeting information. At zero 
the attacker does not know where the enemy unit is located and cannot attack. 
 i.  Defensive Alertness 
A number between zero and one that describes the potential for one force 
to defend against another. At one, the defender is fully manned and ready to defend the 
ship to the maximum capability. At zero the ship has no idea that an attack will take place 
or have the capability of dealing with an attack should it occur. 
 j.  Heavy Defense 
A situation in which a defending force has more defensive missiles to 
shoot at a salvo than there are shots in the salvo. In this case a force can shoot at a salvo 
again using these extra missiles for a second engagement. 
 k.  Heavy Offense 
A situation in which an attacking force fires more shots than the defending 
force can shoot down in one salvo. 
 l.  Parity 
A situation in which the number of attacking shots equals the number of 
defending shots. 
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4. Homogenous Equations 
ΔA = ((σb*β*B)-(τa*a3*A))/a1 
ΔB = ((σa*α*A)-(τb*b3*B))/b1 
Where, 
A = number of units in force A 
B = number of units in force B 
α = number of shots fired by each A unit 
β = number of shots fired by each B unit 
σa = Scouting Effectiveness of A force 
σb = Scouting Effectiveness of B force 
τa = Defensive Alertness of A force 
τb = Defensive Alertness of B force 
a1 = number of hits required to place one A unit out of action 
b1 = number of hits required to place one B unit out of action 
a3 = number of missiles that can be shot down by each A per salvo 
b3 = number of missiles that can be shot down by each B per salvo 
 
B. FILTERING MODEL 
1. Background 
Hughes salvo equations are an elegantly simple method of comparing surface 
combatants. The intent of the filtering model is to allow these same equations to describe 
a greater amount of interaction during a theoretical tactical exchange between two forces. 
The concept of leakers, known for quite some time, has been shown as a historical reality 
(Schulte 1994).  The salvo equations were developed to compare warship attributes, not 
 8
to determine battle outcomes so leakers were relegated as a topic for tactical discussion. 
We wanted to incorporate their effect into a comparison of two forces to determine how 
an additional percentage of leakage would affect the exchange. Leakers are a result of 
imperfect knowledge or in other words are due to fire control system ambiguity and not 
the number of missiles a ship fires in defense. Another concept we wanted to demonstrate 
within the equations is the ability for decoys to dilute an enemy missile raid. Essentially, 
we began adding layers to the original salvo exchange so the model resembled a filter 
where at every layer more enemy missiles could be mitigated. In order to focus on the 
effect of leakers and decoys, we did not add layers for chaff or point defense. Just like the 
salvo equations there are three situations that develop for each force. They encounter a 
strong offense, they have a strong defense or there is parity. In the case of heavy defense 
there are more missiles left to shoot than there are offensive missiles attacking. This case 
is dealt with by allowing the force to have a second engagement on that same salvo. The 
salvo equations result in a Fractional Exchange Ratio between forces. The filtering model 
looks at the number of missiles inbound to a force and the effect decoys and leakers have 
upon that number. This shows the ability of systems to mitigate attacking missiles by 
calculating the number of missiles that continue to the next layer at each step. The 
equations used to calculate the number of missiles is conditional upon the situation of 
strong offense, strong defense, or parity.  
2. Assumptions 
The filtering model has a few more assumptions in addition to the ones described 
for the salvo equations. The first assumption is that a percentage of leakage will occur in 
a salvo based upon the number of attacking missiles. The second assumption is that the 
percentage of leakers that slip through a defensive engagement is constant regardless of 
engagement range. The last assumption is that in a heavy defense situation the force with 
missiles left to fire will get a second engagement within the same salvo. This is despite 




3. Definitions  
 a.  Leaker 
A missile that avoids being shot down by a defending unit because of the   
ambiguity of the fire control system at targeting the shot.  
4. Equations with Conditions 
Initial SAM Engagement: 
Wa = (σb*β*B)-(τa*a3*A)  
Wb = (σa*α*A)-(τb*b3*B) 
Initial Engagement plus Leakers: 
Xa = σb*β*B*λa, Strong A Defense and Parity 
Xa = Wa + (σb*β*B*λa), Strong B Offense 
Xb = σa*α*A*λb, Strong B Defense and Parity 
Xb = σa*α*A*λb, Strong A Offense 
Decoy Dilution 
Ya = A * (Xa/ (δa + A)), Number of Decoys > 0 
Ya = Xa, Number of Decoys = 0 
Yb = B * (Xb/ (δb + B)) , Number of Decoys > 0 
Yb = Xb, Number of Decoys = 0 
Second SAM Engagement: 
Za = Ya*λa, Strong B Offense and Parity 
Za = (Ya - |Wa|) + (Ya*λa), Strong A Defense 
Zb = Yb*λb, Strong A Offense and Parity 
Zb = (Yb - |Wb|) + (Yb*λb), Strong B Defense 
Where, 
 10
Wa = number of B missiles that continue inbound after first engagement 
Wb = number of A missiles that continue inbound after first engagement 
Xa = number of B missiles that continue after 1st engagement plus leakers 
Xb = number of A missiles that continue after 1st engagement plus leakers 
Ya = number of B missiles that continue after decoy dilution 
Yb = number of A missiles that continue after decoy dilution 
Za = number of B missiles that continue to point defense 
Zb = number of A missiles that continue to point defense 
A = number of units in force A 
B = number of units in force B 
α = number of shots fired by each A unit 
β = number of shots fired by each B unit 
a3 = number of missiles that can be shot down by each A per salvo 
b3 = number of missiles that can be shot down by each B per salvo 
δa = number of decoys used by A force 
δb = number of decoys used by B force 
σa = Scouting Effectiveness of A force 
σb = Scouting Effectiveness of B force 
τa = Defensive Alertness of A force 
τb = Defensive Alertness of B force 
λa = Percentage of Leakers that slip through A defense 




5. Model Setup for Analysis 
This thesis uses a Microsoft® Excel spreadsheet as the calculating device to 
implement the filtering model. This was used because of the simplicity of the 
calculations, the ease of programming, and the ability to deal with conditional situations. 
The model was meant to provide quick analysis using simple arithmetic. In fleet use this 
model could be programmed and run with very little training.  
The model allows the user to input different combinations of ship characteristics 
for two forces; A and B. Each force will have four layers of calculations to determine the 
total number of inbound missiles. The initial exchange is based upon Hughes salvo 
equations, whereby the number of attacking missiles is checked against the number of 
missiles fired defensively. The result of this exchange is the number of attacking missiles 
that continue after the first engagement. The salvo model takes this result and divides it 
by the number of hits to place one ship out of action to get the change in the number of 
units. The filter model continues to the next layer with this initial number of inbound 
attacking missiles for each force. This number indicates whether the exchange has heavy 
offense, a strong defense, or if the exchange has reached parity. 
The next layer of calculations adds in a percentage of leakers based on the inputs. 
Throughout our analysis we used .3 (30%) for both forces. Depending on which of the 
three cases the number of leakers will be calculated based on the number of attacking 
missiles and then added to the results from the initial exchange. This will be the number 
of attacking missiles that each force must shoot down.  
After the addition of leakers to the initial exchange numbers the ability for decoys 
to dilute attacking missiles will be assessed. A defending force will most likely be unable 
to determine which missile will be decoyed away so they will have to shoot down all 
inbound missiles. The calculations for decoys diluting attacking missiles away from a 
defending force have been based upon a simple premise; each decoy will be just as 
effective at drawing a missile as a ship. This means that if we have one decoy and one 
ship 50% of the missiles will be drawn to a decoy and 50% will continue to the ship. 
With two decoys this percentage decreases to 33% for each decoy and ship. (Figure 1) If 
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there are no decoys operating for a force then the number of inbound missiles is the same 
as the previous layer. The number of inbound missiles is then evenly allocated across 
decoys and ships to yield a number of missiles that continues to each ship after decoy 
dilution.  
In a heavy defense situation the number of defensive missiles is far higher than 
the number of attacking missiles. The model accounts for this disparity by allowing a 
second engagement upon the same salvo after the decoys have diluted the number of 
inbound missiles. This calculation checks the number of attacking missiles against the 
number of leftover defensive missiles and then adds in the same percentage of leakers as 
calculated in the second layer.  
The resulting number is the number of attacking missiles that continue on to chaff 
and point defense for the entire force. It does not provide any information about how 
many will hit their intended targets. Additional layers of chaff and point defense have not 
been added into our calculations. To incorporate chaff and point defense their effects can 
be added as a final layer of each ship’s defense. The layout shown in Figure 2 is used to 
show the results of our engagements. The model is sequential using the inputs at the top 
to fill in the required information at each subsequent step starting with W and ending at 








































# Units in Force A A 3 % leakers through A def. λa 0.3
# Units in Force B B 6 % leakers through B def. λb 0.3
# Shots fired by each A α 8 Scouting eff. Of A σa 1
# Shots fired by each B β 8 Scouting eff. Of B σb 1
# hits to place 1 A OOA a1 2 Def. Alertness of A τa 1
# hits to place 1 B OOA b1 2 Def. Alertness of B τb 1
# msls destryd by each A a3 8 # of Decoys used by A δa 6
# msls destryd by each B b3 8 # of Decoys used by B δb 0
# A Missiles fired Defensively a3*A 24 # B Missiles fired Defensively b3*B 48
# Inbound B Missiles β*B 48 # Inbound A Missiles α*A 24
# B Missiles that continue after 1st Eng. Wa 24 # A Missiles that continue after 1st Eng. Wb -24
plus # of B Leakers     + 14.4 plus # of A Leakers     + 7.2
# B Missiles that continue in Xa 38.4 # A Missiles that continue in Xb 7.2
minus # diluted by A's decoys - 25.60 minus # diluted by B's decoys - 0.00
# B Missiles that continue in Ya 12.80 # A Missiles that continue in Yb 7.20
Can A engage again? (Y/N) NO Can B engage again? (Y/N) YES
# B Missiles that continue to point defense Za 12.80 # A Missiles that continue to point defense Zb 2.16
Mod Inputs










Wa = ((σb*β*B) - (τa*a3*A)) Wb = ((σa*α*A) - (τb*b3*B))
Strong A Defense
Wa is negative:
            Xa = σb*β*(λa)*B
Parity between A Defense & B Offense
Wa is equal to zero:
            Xa = σb*β*(λa)*B
Strong B Offense
Wa is positive:
            Xa = Wa+ (σb*β*(λa)*B)
Strong B Defense
Wb is negative:
            Xb = σa*α*(λb)*A
Parity between B Defense & A Offense
Wb equals zero:
            Xb = σa*α*(λb)*A
Strong A Offense
Wb is positive:
            Xb = Wb+ (σa*α*(λb)*A)
If # A decoys = 0, then Ya = Xa
If # A decoys > 0, then Ya = #A *(Xa/(#A decoys+ #A))
If # B decoys = 0, then Yb = Xb
If # B decoys > 0, then Yb = #B *(Xb/(#B decoys+ #B))
If Wa is negative, there are missiles left to shoot, which
allows A a second engagement on the same salvo
If Wb is negative, there are missiles left to shoot, which
allows B a second engagement on the same salvo
If |Wa| >= Ya, then Za = Ya*λa
If |Wa| < Ya, then Za = (Ya-|Wa|) + (Ya*λa)
If |Wb| >= Yb, then Zb = Yb*λb
If |Wb| < Yb, then Zb = (Yb-|Wb|) + (Yb*λb)
 
Figure 2.   Filter Model Implementation using Microsoft Excel 
 
 15
III. SCENARIO ANALYSIS 
A. SCENARIO BASE CASE 
1. Background 
This scenario involves a U.S. Surface Action Group (SAG) that has been tasked 
to regain sea control of an open ocean area patrolled by a Chinese SAG. The U.S. Order 
of Battle contains 3 Arleigh Burke DDGs while the Chinese have 3 Luyang II DDGs and 
3 Sovremenny DDGs. We will assume that the Chinese SAG will be expecting the U.S. 
SAG based on American political rhetoric so the scenario begins with both forces in 
Condition 1 (General Quarters) actively seeking to find and attack the other within a 
600x600nm area. The advantage will be with the force who finds the other first and 
attacks first to minimize the possibility for a counter-attack while putting as many enemy 
ships as possible out of action (OOA). Both forces have the expectation of imminent 
attack and will therefore be at the highest readiness level to fight (implying that they will 
be radiating using shipboard radars). The U.S. SAG will not be able to “sneak in” by 
placing the SPY radar in low power or standby because of the imminent threat of attack. 
The strength of the Aegis System is in the SPY radar data. This will require SPY to be 
placed in Full Power 360 degrees.  
The importance of the U.S. forces radiating will become apparent when we 
introduce additional factors that rely upon homogeneous force configuration. Each 
Luyang II will be paired with one Sovremenny Destroyer as an operating pair to 
maximize the capability of the Sovremenny’s offensive missiles while pairing it with the 





SM-2 Standard Missile (SAM) 20 YJ-62 Anti-Ship Missile 8
SM-3 Standard Missile (BMD) - HQ-9 (SAM) Air Defense 48
Tomahawk Land Attack Missile - 100mm Gun 1
Mk 45 5" Gun 1 Close In Weapon System 2
Sunburn Anti-Ship Missile 8
Gadfly (SAM) Air Defense 48
130mm Gun 1
Kashtun Point Defense System 2
# Units in Force A A 3 # Units in Force B B 6
# Shots fired by each A α 0 # Shots fired by each B β 8
# hits to place 1 A OOA a1 2 # hits to place 1 B OOA b1 2
# msls destryd by each A a3 8 # msls destryd by each B b3 8
Scouting eff. Of A σa 1 Scouting eff. Of B σb 1
Def. Alertness of A τa 1 Def. Alertness of B τb 1
% leakers through A def. λa 0.3 % leakers through B def. λb 0.3
# of Decoys used by A δa 0 # of Decoys used by B δb 0
Project 956 Sovremenny Destroyer
Force A: US SAG Force B: Chinese SAG
US SAG Order of Battle
Arleigh Burke Flight IIA Destroyer
Chinese SAG Order of Battle
Type 052C Luyang II Destroyer
 
Table 1.   Presumed U.S. and Chinese Order of Battle and  inputs to the filter model 
2. Introduction 
There are three possible cases to be examined. U.S. (A force) attacks first, China 
(B force) attacks first or there is a simultaneous exchange. By changing σa from 1 to 0 we 
can effectively reduced the scouting effectiveness of A preventing them from targeting 
the B force and similarly for σb. This slight alteration can be used to show the 
consequences of one force being outside the weapons range of another. The Harpoon is 
currently the only offensive weapon that is used by U.S. surface combatants as a long 
range anti-ship cruise missile. Unfortunately, Flight IIA Destroyers do not have this 
weapon and therefore cannot attack using ASCMs. If the Chinese SAG is outside the 
maximum range of this weapon then σa becomes zero and no damage can be inflicted 
upon the Chinese SAG. Missile range is fundamental for attacking first, if at all, during a 
battle. The numbers have been omitted for SM-3 ballistic defense missiles and 
Tomahawk land attack missiles because they do not directly affect the analysis and for 
classification purposes. Also, on all the surface combatants guns do not affect the results 
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because of their short range. It is conceivable if both sides ran out of missiles that gun 
batteries would be employed offensively, but that rare case is not addressed here. We 
placed the guns in the realm of point defense, which is not analyzed in this thesis. 
B. SCENARIO WITH LEAKERS 
1 Assumptions 
In the analysis we will treat the Luyang and the Sovremenny as the same 
homogenous force with the same numbers of offensive and air defense weapons. As 
mentioned, we will use Flight IIA Destroyers, so Harpoons will not be available. 
However, in this initial case we have added them to show what their contribution would 
be. The number of leakers used in these scenarios is set at 30% of the attacking missiles.  
Harpoon Anti Ship Missile 4 YJ-62 Anti-Ship Missile 8
SM-2 Standard Missile (SAM) 20 HQ-9 (SAM) Air Defense 48
SM-3 Standard Missile (BMD) - 100mm Gun 1
Tomahawk Land Attack Missile - Close In Weapon System 2
Mk 45 5" Gun 1
Sunburn Anti-Ship Missile 8
Gadfly (SAM) Air Defense 48
130mm Gun 1
Kashtun Point Defense System 2
# Units in Force A A 3 # Units in Force B B 6
# Shots fired by each A α 4 # Shots fired by each B β 8
# hits to place 1 A OOA a1 2 # hits to place 1 B OOA b1 2
# msls destryd by each A a3 8 # msls destryd by each B b3 8
Scouting eff. Of A σa 0 Scouting eff. Of B σb 1
Def. Alertness of A τa 1 Def. Alertness of B τb 1
% leakers through A def. λa 0.3 % leakers through B def. λb 0.3
# of Decoys used by A δa 0 # of Decoys used by B δb 0
Project 956 Sovremenny Destroyer
Force A: US SAG Force B: Chinese SAG
US SAG Order of Battle
Arleigh Burke Flight IIA Destroyer
Chinese SAG Order of Battle
Type 052C Luyang II Destroyer
 
Table 2.   Base case with σa disadvantage  
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2. Application 
In this scenario the Chinese SAG attacks without a response from the U.S. There 
are two possibilities for this outcome. Either the U.S. SAG is unaware of the imminent 
threat and is completely surprised or the Chinese SAG attacks from outside the range of 
U.S. harpoons. We are examining the case that the U.S. is aware of the imminent threat 
but is unable to respond based on the short range of their Harpoon missiles. The ability 
for the Chinese SAG to attack outside of U.S. offensive range essentially nullifies the 
Harpoon missiles regardless of how many the DDG carries. Leakers add to the number of 
missiles that get through to U.S. point defense additively. In this case even without 
leakers the Chinese attack would be overwhelming based on their numerical advantage 
and offensive missile range.   
The Filter model applied in Figure 3 shows a mathematical artifact embedded 
within the spreadsheet calculations. In the right hand column the number of B force’s 
missiles fired defensively and the number of inbound A force’s missiles is listed. The 
number below that is the number of A missiles that continue after the first engagement, 
named Wb. At this step, the model incorporates σa and τb into the equations as described 
in Equations with Conditions. The next step calculates Xb as shown in Figure 2. If Xb is 
equal to zero then that indicates that σa is also equal to zero and similarly for Xa. When 
σa or σb are equal to zero leakage does not occur.  Figure 4 and Figure 5 also show this 




# Units in Force A A 3 % leakers through A def. λa 0.3
# Units in Force B B 6 % leakers through B def. λb 0.3
# Shots fired by each A α 4 Scouting eff. Of A σa 0
# Shots fired by each B β 8 Scouting eff. Of B σb 1
# hits to place 1 A OOA a1 2 Def. Alertness of A τa 1
# hits to place 1 B OOA b1 2 Def. Alertness of B τb 1
# msls destryd by each A a3 8 # of Decoys used by A δa 0
# msls destryd by each B b3 8 # of Decoys used by B δb 0
# A Missiles fired Defensively a3*A 24 # B Missiles fired Defensively b3*B 48
# Inbound B Missiles β*B 48 # Inbound A Missiles α*A 12
# B Missiles that continue after 1st Eng. Wa 24 # A Missiles that continue after 1st Eng. Wb -48
plus # of B Leakers     + 14.4 plus # of A Leakers     + 0
# B Missiles that continue in Xa 38.4 # A Missiles that continue in Xb 0
minus # diluted by A's decoys - 0.00 minus # diluted by B's decoys - 0.00
# B Missiles that continue in Ya 38.40 # A Missiles that continue in Yb 0.00
Can A engage again? (Y/N) NO Can B engage again? (Y/N) YES
# B Missiles that continue to point defense Za 38.40 # A Missiles that continue to point defense Zb 0.00
Mod Inputs











Figure 3.   Filter model results for base case with σa disadvantage 
C. SCENARIO WITH TASM AND LONG RANGE ISR 
1. Assumptions 
In the place of Harpoon we will use a missile with a long range able to attack 
hundreds of miles away, basically a Tomahawk with the ability to attack surface targets. 
Here, we will refer to this missile as the Tomahawk Anti-Ship Missile (TASM). Without 
specifying an exact range requirement we will describe this missile as having a range in 
excess of the YJ-62 and Sunburn missiles used by the Chinese. In addition to the TASM 
the U.S. will need the capability of long range Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance (ISR) to provide the TASM with over-the-horizon targeting (OTH-T). 
These two upgrades will be described later in more detail.  
 
 20
Tomahawk Anti-Ship Missile 10 YJ-62 Anti-Ship Missile 8
SM-2 Standard Missile (SAM) 20 HQ-9 (SAM) Air Defense 48
SM-3 Standard Missile (BMD) - 100mm Gun 1
Tomahawk Land Attack Missile - Close In Weapon System 2
Mk 45 5" Gun 1
Long Range ISR Capability
Sunburn Anti-Ship Missile 8
Gadfly (SAM) Air Defense 48
130mm Gun 1
Kashtun Point Defense System 2
# Units in Force A A 3 # Units in Force B B 6
# Shots fired by each A α 10 # Shots fired by each B β 8
# hits to place 1 A OOA a1 2 # hits to place 1 B OOA b1 2
# msls destryd by each A a3 8 # msls destryd by each B b3 8
Scouting eff. Of A σa 1 Scouting eff. Of B σb 0
Def. Alertness of A τa 1 Def. Alertness of B τb 1
% leakers through A def. λa 0.3 % leakers through B def. λb 0.3
# of Decoys used by A δa 0 # of Decoys used by B δb 0
Project 956 Sovremenny Destroyer
Force A: US SAG Force B: Chinese SAG
US SAG Order of Battle
Arleigh Burke Flight IIA Destroyer
Chinese SAG Order of Battle
Type 052C Luyang II Destroyer
 
Table 3.   U.S. SAG upgraded with TASM and long range ISR 
2. Application 
The results of upgrading the U.S. SAG with TASM’s and long range ISR are 
predictable. The Chinese SAG has σb reduced to zero because of the longer range of the 
TASM. If we examined a situation in which both forces were within attacking range of 
one another but the U.S. force attacked first the results would be the same. Attacking first 
is a significant advantage as it can significantly reduce the enemy’s capability to 
counterattack. In this case both sides have negative Wa and Wb numbers. This indicates 
that this is a heavy defense situation where the U.S. and the Chinese have more defensive 
missiles than there are attacking missiles. The difference becomes apparent when leakers 
are added in and the American salvo must be engaged a second time by the Chinese. 
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9/4/2008 0:58
# Units in Force A A 3 % leakers through A def. λa 0.3
# Units in Force B B 6 % leakers through B def. λb 0.3
# Shots fired by each A α 10 Scouting eff. Of A σa 1
# Shots fired by each B β 8 Scouting eff. Of B σb 0
# hits to place 1 A OOA a1 2 Def. Alertness of A τa 1
# hits to place 1 B OOA b1 2 Def. Alertness of B τb 1
# msls destryd by each A a3 8 # of Decoys used by A δa 0
# msls destryd by each B b3 8 # of Decoys used by B δb 0
# A Missiles fired Defensively a3*A 24 # B Missiles fired Defensively b3*B 48
# Inbound B Missiles β*B 48 # Inbound A Missiles α*A 30
# B Missiles that continue after 1st Eng. Wa -24 # A Missiles that continue after 1st Eng. Wb -18
plus # of B Leakers     + 0 plus # of A Leakers     + 9
# B Missiles that continue in Xa 0 # A Missiles that continue in Xb 9
minus # diluted by A's decoys - 0.00 minus # diluted by B's decoys - 0.00
# B Missiles that continue in Ya 0.00 # A Missiles that continue in Yb 9.00
Can A engage again? (Y/N) YES Can B engage again? (Y/N) YES
# B Missiles that continue to point defense Za 0.00 # A Missiles that continue to point defense Zb 2.70
Mod Inputs











Figure 4.   Results with upgrades of TASM and long range ISR for U.S. SAG 
D. SCENARIO WITH LOCAL AEW AND DECOYS 
1. Assumptions 
In this scenario the U.S. will not have any offensive missiles but will be upgraded 
defensively by a local airborne early warning (AEW) system. This AEW capability will 
allow decoys to be launched in sufficient time to dilute the number of Chinese missiles 
that continue on to each U.S. unit. The U.S. SAG launches nine decoys, three from each 
DDG. The decoys used in this scenario are the MK-53 Nulka systems currently operating 
on U.S. Destroyers. We will describe their capability by their ability to draw a missile 
away from a ship. It is assumed that each decoy has an equal probability of drawing an 
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attacking missile as a DDG. (See Figure 1) The number of shots fired by each DDG has 
been set at 10, but this number is inconsequential because σa is zero. 
 
SM-2 Standard Missile (SAM) 20 YJ-62 Anti-Ship Missile 8
SM-3 Standard Missile (BMD) - HQ-9 (SAM) Air Defense 48
Tomahawk Land Attack Missile - 100mm Gun 1
Mk 45 5" Gun 1 Close In Weapon System 2
Local Airborne Early Warning Capability
3 Decoys launched per Destroyer Sunburn Anti-Ship Missile 8
Gadfly (SAM) Air Defense 48
130mm Gun 1
Kashtun Point Defense System 2
# Units in Force A A 3 # Units in Force B B 6
# Shots fired by each A α 10 # Shots fired by each B β 8
# hits to place 1 A OOA a1 2 # hits to place 1 B OOA b1 2
# msls destryd by each A a3 8 # msls destryd by each B b3 8
Scouting eff. Of A σa 0 Scouting eff. Of B σb 1
Def. Alertness of A τa 1 Def. Alertness of B τb 1
% leakers through A def. λa 0.3 % leakers through B def. λb 0.3
# of Decoys used by A δa 9 # of Decoys used by B δb 0
Project 956 Sovremenny Destroyer
Force A: US SAG Force B: Chinese SAG
US SAG Order of Battle
Arleigh Burke Flight IIA Destroyer
Chinese SAG Order of Battle
Type 052C Luyang II Destroyer
 
Table 4.   U.S. SAG upgraded with local AEW and decoys 
2. Application 
The results from this scenario show the ability for decoys to dilute the number of 
attacking missiles. Leakage increases the number of missiles by a significant amount as 
shown in the difference between Wa and Xa. Nine decoys dilute the number of inbound 
missiles from 38.4 to 9.6 missiles. Even though this is case of a strong Chinese offense, 
we see that with decoys the U.S. can significantly reduce the number of missiles that 
must be dealt with using point defense. The model conducts a check after calculating Ya 
and Yb to see if the SAG can have a second engagement upon the salvo. This depends on 
whether there are missiles left to shoot for that salvo. So if Wa or Wb is negative, then 
there are extra missiles that can add a second engagement. In this firing environment it 
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would be difficult to determine if a missile was decoyed away or not so the defending 
unit would need to engage every missile regardless of whether it was headed for a ship or 
a decoy.  
Interestingly, the results shown in Figure 6 agree with the results of Professor Jeff 
Kline where he shows that defensive decoys reduce the affect of σb and similarly σa with 
an inverse square relationship. (Kline 2008) It is possible that both these results are due to 
the underlying relationship of dilution by decoys shown in Figure 1.  
 
9/4/2008 1:20
# Units in Force A A 3 % leakers through A def. λa 0.3
# Units in Force B B 6 % leakers through B def. λb 0.3
# Shots fired by each A α 10 Scouting eff. Of A σa 0
# Shots fired by each B β 8 Scouting eff. Of B σb 1
# hits to place 1 A OOA a1 2 Def. Alertness of A τa 1
# hits to place 1 B OOA b1 2 Def. Alertness of B τb 1
# msls destryd by each A a3 8 # of Decoys used by A δa 9
# msls destryd by each B b3 8 # of Decoys used by B δb 0
# A Missiles fired Defensively a3*A 24 # B Missiles fired Defensively b3*B 48
# Inbound B Missiles β*B 48 # Inbound A Missiles α*A 30
# B Missiles that continue after 1st Eng. Wa 24 # A Missiles that continue after 1st Eng. Wb -48
plus # of B Leakers     + 14.4 plus # of A Leakers     + 0
# B Missiles that continue in Xa 38.4 # A Missiles that continue in Xb 0
minus # diluted by A's decoys - 28.80 minus # diluted by B's decoys - 0.00
# B Missiles that continue in Ya 9.60 # A Missiles that continue in Yb 0.00
Can A engage again? (Y/N) NO Can B engage again? (Y/N) YES
# B Missiles that continue to point defense Za 9.60 # A Missiles that continue to point defense Zb 0.00
Mod Inputs










Figure 5.   Results of U.S. SAG upgraded with local AEW and decoys 
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Defensive benefit of decoys with one engagement per salvo
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Figure 6.   Defensive benefit of decoys 
E. SCENARIO WITH COMBINED UPGRADES 
1. Assumptions 
In this scenario the U.S. Destroyers are upgraded with the offensive and defensive 
capabilities explored in the previous two scenarios. The range of each force’s offensive 
weapons is crucial. We will assume that both forces are within missile firing range of 
each other for the interest of discussion. To assess what the result would be of a surprise 
attack by one force we would only need to look at one side’s attack or vice versa.  
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Tomahawk Anti-Ship Missile 10 YJ-62 Anti-Ship Missile 8
SM-2 Standard Missile (SAM) 20 HQ-9 (SAM) Air Defense 48
SM-3 Standard Missile (BMD) - 100mm Gun 1
Tomahawk Land Attack Missile - Close In Weapon System 2
Mk 45 5" Gun 1
Long Range Intel, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
Local Airborne Early Warning Capability Sunburn Anti-Ship Missile 8
3 Decoys launched per Destroyer Gadfly (SAM) Air Defense 48
130mm Gun 1
Kashtun Point Defense System 2
# Units in Force A A 3 # Units in Force B B 6
# Shots fired by each A α 10 # Shots fired by each B β 8
# hits to place 1 A OOA a1 2 # hits to place 1 B OOA b1 2
# msls destryd by each A a3 8 # msls destryd by each B b3 8
Scouting eff. Of A σa 1 Scouting eff. Of B σb 1
Def. Alertness of A τa 1 Def. Alertness of B τb 1
% leakers through A def. λa 0.3 % leakers through B def. λb 0.3
# of Decoys used by A δa 9 # of Decoys used by B δb 0
Project 956 Sovremenny Destroyer
Force A: US SAG Force B: Chinese SAG
US SAG Order of Battle
Arleigh Burke Flight IIA Destroyer
Chinese SAG Order of Battle
Type 052C Luyang II Destroyer
 
Table 5.   U.S. SAG with Combined upgrades 
2. Application 
As in the previous scenarios the advantage of a first strike is significant. If there is 
a simultaneous exchange then the Chinese SAG would be expected to fare better with 
more ships to deal with fewer attacking missiles. The offensive capability of TASM 
would be reduced if it were not used at the maximum range possible. Targeting 
information would be very important for both forces. Even when both sides are within 
each other’s attack range this still might be OTH which would require third party 
targeting or advanced missile capability to find and hit a target. The difference in the 
number of missiles that each SAG must defeat with point defense is small relative to the 
number of missiles fired. Leakage is a factor for both forces, but more significantly for 
the Chinese. The number of missiles that each U.S. unit must defeat using point defense 
is at least three. As an upper limit one DDG might have to deal with up to ten attacking 
missiles. Depending on what specific point defense system is used three to ten missiles 
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might be too much for one unit to handle. Three U.S. Destroyers might not be enough to 
compete with six Chinese Destroyers, but if we add one more DDG of the same 
specifications to the U.S. SAG we reach parity. Additionally, this relationship holds for 
multiples of four to six (e.g. 2:3, 4:6, 8:12, 16:24) with three decoys per DDG. The 
importance of this result is that three decoys costing in the thousands of dollars can 
mitigate the combat potential of warships costing in the millions or billions of dollars. 
Also, a U.S. Navy SAG Commander can be armed with the knowledge that to maintain a 




# Units in Force A A 3 % leakers through A def. λa 0.3
# Units in Force B B 6 % leakers through B def. λb 0.3
# Shots fired by each A α 10 Scouting eff. Of A σa 1
# Shots fired by each B β 8 Scouting eff. Of B σb 1
# hits to place 1 A OOA a1 2 Def. Alertness of A τa 1
# hits to place 1 B OOA b1 2 Def. Alertness of B τb 1
# msls destryd by each A a3 8 # of Decoys used by A δa 9
# msls destryd by each B b3 8 # of Decoys used by B δb 0
# A Missiles fired Defensively a3*A 24 # B Missiles fired Defensively b3*B 48
# Inbound B Missiles β*B 48 # Inbound A Missiles α*A 30
# B Missiles that continue after 1st Eng. Wa 24 # A Missiles that continue after 1st Eng. Wb -18
plus # of B Leakers     + 14.4 plus # of A Leakers     + 9
# B Missiles that continue in Xa 38.4 # A Missiles that continue in Xb 9
minus # diluted by A's decoys - 28.80 minus # diluted by B's decoys - 0.00
# B Missiles that continue in Ya 9.60 # A Missiles that continue in Yb 9.00
Can A engage again? (Y/N) NO Can B engage again? (Y/N) YES
# B Missiles that continue to point defense Za 9.60 # A Missiles that continue to point defense Zb 2.70
Mod Inputs
















# Units in Force A A 4 % leakers through A def. λa 0.3
# Units in Force B B 6 % leakers through B def. λb 0.3
# Shots fired by each A α 10 Scouting eff. Of A σa 1
# Shots fired by each B β 8 Scouting eff. Of B σb 1
# hits to place 1 A OOA a1 2 Def. Alertness of A τa 1
# hits to place 1 B OOA b1 2 Def. Alertness of B τb 1
# msls destryd by each A a3 8 # of Decoys used by A δa 12
# msls destryd by each B b3 8 # of Decoys used by B δb 0
# A Missiles fired Defensively a3*A 32 # B Missiles fired Defensively b3*B 48
# Inbound B Missiles β*B 48 # Inbound A Missiles α*A 40
# B Missiles that continue after 1st Eng. Wa 16 # A Missiles that continue after 1st Eng. Wb -8
plus # of B Leakers     + 14.4 plus # of A Leakers     + 12
# B Missiles that continue in Xa 30.4 # A Missiles that continue in Xb 12
minus # diluted by A's decoys - 22.80 minus # diluted by B's decoys - 0.00
# B Missiles that continue in Ya 7.60 # A Missiles that continue in Yb 12.00
Can A engage again? (Y/N) NO Can B engage again? (Y/N) YES
# B Missiles that continue to point defense Za 7.60 # A Missiles that continue to point defense Zb 7.60
Mod Inputs








































A. FILTERING MODEL PERFORMANCE 
1. Summary 
The Filtering Model of salvo warfare, as an extension of the Hughes Salvo 
Equations, provides a rapid, transparent method for comparing Surface Action Groups. 
The results show how significant leakers can be in an ASCM attack, even in heavily 
defensive scenarios. This model shows the potential for decoys to distract and eliminate a 
significant number of missiles prior to them reaching point defense systems. Currently 
the disparity between a U.S. and Chinese Surface Action Group is most apparent in the 
lack of long range offensive missiles. The results show that defensive missiles such as the 
SM-2 and the ESSM might prevent defeat but they cannot create victory. Offensive 
missiles such as the TASM are crucial in the absence of carrier based strike aircraft. The 
scenarios show that even a small amount of leakage can have a significant effect on the 
number of missiles that get through to point defense. When a Surface Action Group can 
dilute the number of inbound missiles with decoys the attacker’s advantage is greatly 
reduced so that the active point defense has a much better chance to defeat the inbound 
ASCMs. 
2. Capabilities and Limitations 
This is a high level, low resolution, flexible, deterministic model. It is meant to 
provide an analysis for force comparison that is as good as the performance data 
available. The model is not a reliable predictor of losses, but it will give rich insight as to 
how well one side matches up with the other. We limited our analysis of the missile 
salvos up to the point in which they would be engaged by point defense. The effects of 
jamming and chaff have been excluded for more emphasis on leakers and decoys, 
although it would not be difficult to incorporate them. The model discuses combat 
 30
scenarios but is not intended to recommend specific tactics. The insight gained regarding 
vital ship characteristics is the central focus of the model and not battle outcomes. 
B. RECOMMENDED DESTROYER CAPABILITIES AND CONCEPT OF 
OPERATIONS 
1. Key Upgrades 
The tactical aim is to launch a successful attack before the enemy can do so. But, 
the tactical plan must take account of a possible enemy first attack or exchange of 
ASCMs. Based on the analysis in this thesis we recommend three upgrades to current 
DDGs to prepare them for the mission of maintaining sea control against a Chinese 
Surface Action Group. The first upgrade to our DDGs is a TASM-like missile with a 
range of about 300 nautical miles. Currently, the U.S. is outranged by missiles like the 
YJ-62. This allows the Chinese SAG to attack without the potential for a U.S. 
counterattack. The second upgrade for our DDGs is to incorporate unmanned aerial 
systems to provide offensive and defensive AEW. The offensive scouting would be 
provided by the land-based maritime variant of Global Hawk. This would provide 
persistent offensive ISR for extended periods of time. In addition to Global Hawk we 
propose using the Fire Scout to provide local ISR and AEW for the SAG in a defensive 
role. The sensor data of both Global Hawk and Fire Scout fused with the Aegis System 
would greatly enhance offensive and defensive readiness. AEW provided by both 
systems would increase time to react to surprise attacks allowing for judicious use of 
decoys. Thirdly, decoys are crucial to diluting enemy raids. Fourthly, the allocation for 
missile quantities is also important. Each proposed DDG would have 10 TASM, 10 cells 
of ESSM, and 24 SM-2s, with the remaining cells available for SM-3s or TLAMs. These 
quantities have not undergone the scrutiny of sensitivity analysis but the need is evident 
that a USN SAG facing the PLA-N must have a strong element of these four capabilities. 
2. Proposed Concept of Operations 
A U.S. SAG of 4 upgraded DDGs would have 2 dedicated Global Hawks 
patrolling a 120 degree threat sector to locate and track an enemy SAG at a range of 80 to 
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100 nautical miles from the U.S. SAG. The tracking data would allow the U.S. to launch 
an attack using the new TASM’s. On defense each DDG would carry 3 Fire Scouts 
rotating on station providing local ISR and AEW. Upon indication of an imminent attack 
each vessel would launch 3 decoys and use fused tracking information to engage the 
inbound salvo with SM-2s. The SM-2s will be used against ASCMs while saving the 
ESSM’s for the potential threat of Harpy-like attacks. The offensive shortfalls are 
addressed with TASM and Global Hawk while the defensive shortfall is handled using 
Fire Scout and decoys.  
C. PROPOSED MISSILE AND UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS 
1. Background 
There are two ways a navy can deal with tactical shortfalls, build new platforms 
specifically suited to that mission, or update the systems on existing platforms. The U.S. 
Navy has depended on the large American industrial base and a virtual blank check to 
design and introduce new platforms. This is an expensive but suitable way of dealing 
with new threats. Unfortunately, this method results in a guessing game of calculating 
what the next conflict will present in the way of new threats, and even well planned 
platforms can be outpaced by the rate of change on the battlefield of the sea. The danger, 
therefore, is that navies will prepare to fight the conflict of tomorrow with the platforms 
of yesterday.  The decision to upgrade older platforms with suitable new systems can be a 
faster more cost effective means to adapt to change. In 1991 the U.S. Navy did this with 
the USS Missouri, adding tomahawk missile canisters and upgrading the combat systems 
suite to use in the first Gulf War. Current warships have modernization plans that 
incorporate sequential development of onboard systems; the systems proposed are not 
currently operational. We are proposing a concept of operations that requires only three 
key systems upgrades to allow Arleigh Burke Destroyers to accomplish a sea control 
mission against a similarly composed force. 
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1. Tomahawk Anti Ship Missile (TASM) 
The Tomahawk Anti Ship Missile was designed to carry a nuclear warhead, but as 
a result of the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty it was destroyed. Future 
variants of the tomahawk emerged as land attack missiles providing surface combatants 
with a potent deep-strike capability. The TASM non-nuclear variant never reemerged for 
maritime use. This oversight has left a capability gap in U.S. surface combatants ability 
to attack an enemy first, from outside his engagement range. We propose bringing back 
the TASM for use in surface warfare against a sea control navy. Unlike the Harpoon, the 
TASM can be stored and launched like a Tomahawk Land Attack variant but would 
provide a significant advantage in range and mission flexibility. By placing the TASM in 
the Mk-41 Vertical Launching System the ship also removes weight above the main deck 
that can be reallocated for point defense systems. Table 6 is a notional concept for a 
TASM or TASM-like missile for our proposed concept of operations.  
 
Dimensions: Performance:
Length 20 feet 6 inches Max Range 300nm
Diameter 20 inches Warhead Conventional 1000 lbs
Wing Span 8 feet 9 inches Speed Subsonic- 250kt
Weight 3200 lbs Guidance: Inertial, Datalink, GPS
Notional Tomahawk Anti Ship Missile (TASM)
 
Table 6.   Notional Tomahawk Anti Ship Missile (TASM) characteristics 
2. Fire Scout 
The Northrop Grumman MQ-8B Fire Scout is undergoing development for 
deployment on U.S. Navy Littoral Combat Ships. (Northrop Grumman 2008) We propose 
adapting this system for use with U.S. Arleigh Burke Destroyers. The system would be 
stationed at a suitable distance from the launching unit to provide point airborne early 
warning (AEW) in a threat sector using electro-optical (EO) and infrared (IR) scanning 
sensors. Additionally, Fire Scout could provide targeting data and laser designation of 
inbound missiles to the launching unit integrating with the Cooperative Engagement 
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Capability (CEC). This would allow a defending unit to engage attacking missiles at 
ranges that would maximize probability of hit against these threats. When seconds can 
decide the difference in a defending unit’s ability to counter an attack a Fire Scout could 
provide the luxury time to make decisions and launch defensive SAM’s. Fire Scout’s 
AEW capacity will also allow adequate time to launch decoys which, as the analysis will 
show, can significantly change the result of an attack. For an individual unit to keep three 
Fire Scouts airborne they would most likely require three more spares and then an 
additional two in maintenance status. This would require each Destroyer to carry eight 
Fire Scouts. An SH-60B weighs approximately 21884 lbs. Eight Fire Scouts would weigh 
about 21600 lbs based on an individual weight of 2700 lbs. The potential for greater 
reaction time from increased AEW is arguably worth replacing one SH-60B. 
 
Dimensions: Performance:
Height 9 feet Max Endurance 8 hours
Length 23 feet Max Altitude 20,000 ft
Main Rotor Diameter 27 feet Communications Datalink, LOS
Gross Weight 2700 lb Loiter Speed 115kt
Payload 130 lb Sensors EO, IR, Laser Desig
Notional Fire Scout Unmanned Aerial System
 
Table 7.   Notional Fire Scout Unmanned Aerial System characteristics 
3. Global Hawk, Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) 
Current satellite maritime surveillance capabilities cannot provide targeting data 
to surface combatants. This shortfall requires a dedicated ISR asset that can forward 
accurate targeting data for offensive attack. Northrop Grumman has developed the RQ-
4B Block 20 Global Hawk for the U.S. Navy’s Broad Area Maritime Surveillance 
requirement. (Northrop Grumman 2008) The system provides persistent high altitude 
long-endurance reconnaissance with high resolution. The sensors onboard the Global 
Hawk includes visible, electro-optical, infrared and synthetic aperture radar system 
(SAR) incorporated with a moving target indicator (MTI). Communications systems 
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onboard would allow for reconnaissance information transmission to various data links, 
satellite, or LOS receivers. The operating altitude of this system helps minimize the threat 
of surface to air missiles launched from surface combatants. Our proposed concept of 
operations uses the Global Hawk to provide accurate location information of enemy 
surface combatants. This information allows for a surprise attack against an enemy 
surface action group using TASM. The Global Hawk system and the TASM provide the 
potential to defeat a sea control navy with a first strike before the enemy even knows they 
are being attacked. 
 
Dimensions: Performance:
Height 16 feet Wide Area Search 40,000nm2 per day
Length 48 feet Max Endurance 33 hours
Wing Span 131 feet Max Altitude 65,000 ft
Gross Weight 25,600 lb Communications Satellite, Datalink, LOS
Payload 2000 lb Loiter Speed 300kt
Sensors EO, IR, MTI, SAR
Notional Global Hawk Maritime Unmanned Aerial System
 
Table 8.   Notional Global Hawk Maritime Unmanned Aerial System characteristics 
D. FUTURE RESEARCH 
1. Timeline Analysis 
Time is a critical factor in Surface Warfare. Additional time to engage salvos can 
provide greater depth of fire and more accurate tracking data. ISR information provided 
by UASs can alter the amount of time to respond to incoming salvos. A timeline analysis 
could provide another perspective on the number and stationing of UASs. 
2. Range Dependent Lambda 
In our analysis lambda remained constant for both forces. Since lambda is 
dependent upon the ships’ Fire Control Systems ambiguity we could alter it to more 
accurately reflect different Fire Control Systems. A new SPY or active electronically 
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steered array (AESA) radar would most likely change lambda. Engaging an inbound 
salvo at a greater range will increase lambda while engaging at a preferred range would 
decrease it. This analysis could shape firing doctrine and UAS stationing with more 
accurate missile tracking data from UASs. 
3. Attacking Unmanned Aerial Systems 
In our proposed Concept of Operations we recommended reserving ESSMs for a 
Harpy-like threat. This model could be applied as a one sided battle in which numerous 
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